Outstanding game, and quite a 7th inning.

You know, it’s hard to criticize the use of pitchers in that situation. The nature of baseball is to second guess, which makes it such a great sport for fans. But I can’t fault the Sox for how they handled the pitching there. You want to use Papelbon, and maybe that makes sense. But two factors work against it: 1) the psychology of the closer—is he geared at that moment to inherit a situation not of his making? and 2) the lack of confidence it shows in the rest of your presumably valuable staff.

There may be short-term gains-you get out of the inning, and may even win-but the long-term downside may be an inclination to lean on Papelbon in similar situations, and avoid your other guys. What does this do to their psyche? How does it affect your closer? What happens in the 9th, if the game suddenly is close, and the opposition knows your closer is out? They will play differently, and with more confidence.

I’d have played it like the Sox, for better or worse.

Now that said, that 7th inning really reminded me of something else: the 6th game of the 2002 World Series. Angels down 5-0 to the Giants, going nowhere. Then lightning strikes, the Giants bullpen unravels (Baker was heavily second-guessed), and suddenly the Angels are in the game. The shot Longoria hit up the gap tonight was a carbon copy of the one Glaus did in that 6th game, with a similar devastating effect. Winning Game 7 for the Angels was a foregone conclusion after that.

In fact, the Rays really remind me of that 2002 Angels team in so many ways. Scrappy, opportunistic, good pitching and defense, timely hitting. And loads of self-confidence. I’m really liking what I’m seeing here…

Yes, I do not like second guessing in most cases, but I am really not talking about that here. What I am considering is a style of play, and approach to the game that has become the norm. As I said, Francona did what every manager today would do; I think it is the wrong way to use a bullpen.

And I think you are right Calif, it was probably impossible given the mind-set of closers to do it differently. But again, that is a function of the way the game has evolved. There was a time, for example, when it was unlikely a manager would relieve a tired ace starter in the ninth inning because he did not want to embarrass him. The complete game was a sign of toughness then. The psychology of the closer is not inherent. It has evolved with the game and is essentially taught, just as the pride in finishing once was assumed and now is no longer.

But like the 5 man rotation, which I also think is probably an inefficient way to use a staff, it has become ingrained as the norm and woe betide the manager or GM who violates the orthodox approach, especially if there is a loss. Remember the hooting when Boston supposedly went to a bullpen by committee (something they never did, by the way)?

I always though the Rays might be the team to break the mold, given our need to experiment, to be efficient and given that our talent at the major league level used to be so thin. It seemed we might be able to try to use relievers according to the situation and their particular matchup rather than by stereotyping the roles, because at one time we had nobody who had earned the status of closer and so there was less of a psychological impediment. Alas, no such luck.

Shortly after the Sox hired Bill James as an adviser they decided to attempt his long-fabled situational bullpen. It failed quickly and failed miserably. Since then the legend that someone must possess the icy-water veined closer mentality in order to finish games has become almost fact. I don’t understand why someone must be a stone cold killer to finish a game up three in the ninth, but any pansy can come in a get an out with their team up one and RISP with one out. As you pointed out, it doesn’t make too much sense. Then again, look what happened when Cooper brought in Brocail instead of Valverde.

The good thing about the Rays this year is that their best relief pitchers are not the closer. Howell and Wheeler are the designated 7-8 guys and Balfour has been the wild card. Having players like that available to go into any situation make this team that much better.

I think other factors have become significant as well, and one of them is economics. There is big money being a designated closer, and to change the closer’s role might affect his bargaining power.

That is why I hoped the Rays might try using relievers differently without designating one as the closer. Last year, there was nobody on the team with a history of closing, and I thought it possible that the economic (and psychological) factors might be less serious if the relievers were used according to situation instead of by stereotyping roles. It seemed to me that it could save the Rays a lot of money if it had worked and would have made us cutting edge in strategy.

The problem Boston faced was not that it used situational relievers but that its relievers were not very good. Naturally, if you get Foulke you improve the bullpen regardless of how you use him. But once he was there, he had to be used only in the 9th inning to finish.

I have little doubt that pitchers now are programmed to pitch better when they “know their roles”. Maddon is making a fuss about that now as he rearranges roles with Percival and Reyes out. But ultimately the role is the same no matter what; get batters out and do not allow runs to score. Historically, there was no particular attention paid to whether that was done in the 1st inning or 9th. But as the bullpen evolved, it became an article of faith that different pitchers were better in the 9th than others when it is more likely they were simply better pitchers. After all, how many set-up men or middle relievers are converted to closing every year and do fine?

Of course I don’t want Glover* pitching the 9th of a close game-or even a blowout. But that is not because he does not have a closer’s mentality; it is because he tends to give up too many runs. I assume he is not as mentally tough as Percival because he has not been as successful, not because he is mentally weaker. I mean, if they put me in to pitch the 9th I’d be scared stiff not because I am a wimp but because I could not get major leaguers out.

*I thought Glover did an admirable job last night-again. Typically, he weakened, which I expect from mediocre pitchers, and I was stunned and worried when Maddon brought him in and then left him in for another inning, but he did assist the victory.

I haven’t read all the posts since most are long. So I’m sorry if I rehash anything someone else has said.

I do like having somewhat defined roles. I think it seems to help members of the bullpen, but I do think that there are times that call for you to bring in your best relief pitcher(usually your closer) at times other than to close the game. I think what makes the the Rays bullpen so succesful this year is that they have many reliable options for the 7th and 8th. Howell, Wheeler, and lately Balfour have been outstanding. Some teams don’t have that luxury. Even in a situation where maybe the 3,4,5 hitters are due up in the 8th. I think that going to your closer to get these guys outs would sometimes be a better option than waiting till the 9th to face the bottom of the lineup.

Why wasn’t Aardsma the choice either prior to Delcarman or instead of Hansen. And where was Okajima?

Both had pitched the night before. Hansen had thrown 20 pitches, again wildly, and put 2 runners on via BB (foreshadowing there?) one of which Delcarman allowed to score for an important insurance run.

While Aardsma is prone to the BB himself, he’s no worse than Hansen in that regard and has consistently outpitched him. And he hadn’t yet pitched in the series. Nor had Okajima, supposedly their top setup guy. That to me is even more strange than not using Papelbon. Is getting a guy (or 2) that failed recently “back on the horse” so to speak more important than wining a game with the tea you’re chasing in the standings?

Your philosophical question is a good – we’ll probably have to wait for Tony LaRussa Jr. to manage before the closer role evolves as you envision. But in this case the strategy is even confusing from a much more conventional perspective.

had pitched the previous inning. I am not sure why he was not brought out to start the 7th, but he was no longer available once someone else did.